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Death and Transfiguration of the State
Action Doctrine-Moose Lodge v. Irvis
to Runyon v. McCrary
By LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN*

Last year the Supreme Court held, in Runyon v. McCrary,' that federal
law prohibits private schools from discriminating in student admissions on
the basis of race. This decision was the latest in a long series of surprises
from a Court that still professes to believe that the "state action" doctrine
governs its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Few will argue
with the contention that the Supreme Court decisions involving the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments during the last ten years have wrought
very drastic changes in the state action doctrine. Indeed, the changes have
been so drastic that what the Court now calls the "state action" doctrine is
actually something else, a "public sphere" doctrine. The public sphere
doctrine, strangely enough, was originally presented in a dissent by Justice
John Marshall Harlan in the 1883 Civil Rights Cases,' as an alternative to
the state action doctrine espoused by the majority in that case.
2

While the original state action doctrine limited the power of Congress
to protect an individual's civil rights to situations involving state discrimination, the alternative public sphere doctrine would extend that congressional
power throughout the public sphere (the sphere of civic life that includes the
commercial world of buying and selling) and would limit the extension only
at the point where the private sphere (the sphere of private family life and
private associations) begins.
While the state action doctrine hinges upon the words "no state. .
that begin the second sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, the public
sphere doctrine focuses on the affirmative grant of citizenship that comprises
the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment and on those rights due each
citizen that may be inferred therefrom. The author posits that the Court's
unannounced shift to the public sphere doctrine actually began in 1972 in the
Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Delaware.
1. 96 S. Ct. 2586 (1976).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
*

3.

109 U.S. 3, 26-62 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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case of Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis," although that shift has gone virtually
unnoticed in the legal commentary.' Pursuing this initial proposition, the
author argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Runyon makes more
sense if viewed as a case that exemplifies the developing public sphere
doctrine, rather than as a case that recapitulates the defunct state action
doctrine. Finally, the author suggests that the Court should enunciate this as
yet inarticulated shift in approach' in order to clarify a murky area of
constitutional law.
In order to explain the Court's implicit adoption of the public sphere
doctrine in 1972, it is necessary to trace the legal developments that produced the need for that shift in approach. By 1972, as a result of a series of
Fourteenth Amendment decisions, the Supreme Court had so minimized the
degree of governmental involvement needed to qualify as state actionthereby invoking the constitutional mandate prohibiting racial
discrimination-that it was hard to imagine any sphere of private life that
remained free for the exercise of legitimate associational liberty. The other
4. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
5. Commentary on the Moose Lodge case is almost unanimous in viewing it simply
as a further elaboration, narrowing, or clarification of the state action doctrine. See, e.g.,
Bassett, The Reemergence of the "State Action" Requirement in Race Relations Cases,
22 CATH. U. L. REV. 39, 40 (1972); Kurland, The 1971 Term: The Year of the
Stewart-White Court, 1972 SuP. CT. REV. 181, 187-90; Note, ConstitutionalLaw-The
Private Club: Another Reprieve, 27 ARK. L. REV. 146 (1973); Note, The Sacred Cow: A
Private Club's Right to Discriminate Notwithstanding Its Support and Maintenance by
Virtue of a State Granted and Regulated Liquor License-Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
17 How. L.J. 693 (1972); Note, The Scope of PermissibleState Interference with Racial
Discriminationby Private FraternalOrganizations, 4 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 338, 341 (1973);
Note, The Rights of Private Clubs to Discriminate Against Black Guests Despite a StateIssued Liquor License, 26 U. MIAMI L. REV. 833 (1972); 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 481
(1972); 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 695 (1973); 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 888 (1973); 8 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 598 (1972).
The single comment that noticed the emergence of a public sphere-private sphere
doctrine in Moose Lodge advocated a return to a genuine state action doctrine. See 22 J.
PuB. L. 281, 287, 289 (1973).
6. This is not the first time that the Court has instituted a new constitutional doctrine while laiming to follow an old one. One recent article demonstrated, contrary to the
accepted wisdom, that the substantive incorporation of freedom of speech into the due
process clause did not explicitly begin in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
Although an unarticulated trend toward that incorporation did begin in Gitlow, the fully
explicit acknowledgment of incorporation did not come until Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697 (1931). See Heberle, From Gitlow to Near: Judicial Amendment bV Absent-Minded
Incrementalism, 34 J. POL. 458 (1972). The classic description of the phenomenon of the
unarticulated precedent was Justice Jackson's sardonic comment in one dissent that the
disparity between what the Court claimed to be doing and what it actually was doing reminded him of Byron's Julia who "whispering 'I will ne'er consent,'-consented." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 19 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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wall of the doctrinal corner into which the Court had backed itself by 1972
involved the invigoration of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982.' Based on statutes
originally passed in 1866 to effect the policies enunciated in the Thirteenth
Amendment, 8 these statutes prohibited racial discrimination in all contracts,
sales, conveyances, and similar transactions. Because the original state action doctrine had been read into the Thirteenth Amendment in 1883, 9 these
statutes had for nearly ninety years been interpreted as forbidding only
governmental discrimination. Once the Supreme Court began to enforce
these statutes literally in 1968, it became necessary to confront some thorny
but nevertheless crucial questions. Just how private did a contractual relationship have to be in order to be protected from the reach of these civil
rights provisions? Or are all contracts that involve elements of racial discrimination subject to the sanctions imposed by these statutes?
The shift by the Supreme Court toward the public sphere doctrine was
gradual. One can divide it into two phases. In the first phase, in a series of
cases involving racial discrimination from Shelley v. Kraemer'" through
Reitman v. Mulkey," the Court increasingly blurred the distinction between
private action and state action.' This trend became so pronounced that
Justice Douglas in 1966 finally advocated the substitution of a modified
public sphere doctrine in lieu of the state action concept in Evans v.
Newton . 13 His innovative effort went unheeded, however, and Court opinions before and since 1966 continued to employ the state action model 4 in
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1970).
8. See Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2593 n.8 (1976); cf. id. at 2604
(White, J., dissenting).
9. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 16-17 (1883). See notes 41-45 -and accompanying text infra.
10. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).,
11. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
12. This article limits itself to the decline of the state action doctrine in racial discrimination cases. The author believes that such separate treatment is justified because (1)
it is universally recognized that the original concern of the Fourteenth Amendment was
racial discrimination, and (2) the Court continues to be more generous in finding state
action when race discrimination is involved than in other situations. See Note, State Action: Theoriesfor Applying ConstitutionalRestrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L.
REV. 656, 658-61 (1974). See also Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
13. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
14. Justice Douglas' lone concurring opinion in Reitman was the only opinion
based on the distinction between the public and private domains. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369, 385 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring). And only Justice Douglas' dissenting
opinion (with Justice Marshall concurring) in Moose Lodge refers explicitly to this distinction. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-81 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). For a tracing of the dilution of the state action doctrine during phase one, see
Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the
Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 102 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
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analyzing claims involving such seemingly private racial discrimination as
that committed by the manager of a private restaurant leasing a site located
on state lands1" and by landlords renting private apartments while discrimination was permitted by the state constitution.16
Phase two began with the decision in United States v. Guest17 and was
perpetuated by the holdings in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co."8 and Griffin v.
Breckenridge. In this phase the Court entirely rejected the basic rule established in the Civil Rights Cases that
until some State law has been passed, or some State action through its
officers or agents has been taken, adverse to the rights of citizens sought
to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, no legislation of the
United States under said amendment. . . can be called into activity: for
the prohibitions of the amendment are against State laws and acts done
under State authority. 2"
Once this rule was rejected, the state action doctrine no longer limited the
power of Congress to prohibit racial discrimination. Congress might judge a
particular privilege to be part of the universal civil freedom granted by the
Thirteenth Amendment or part of the citizenship granted by the Fourteenth
Amendment and might then prohibitprivate interference wvith that privilege.
By 1971 the state action doctrine seemed to be viable only for determination
of which rights the Fourteenth Amendment created on its own without
positive congressional action. 2 '
Cox]. See also Black, The Supreme Court 1966 Term, Foreword: "State Action," Equal
Protection and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 83-95 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Black].
15. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
16. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
17. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
18. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
19. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
20. 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883). See also Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment Against PrivateActs, 73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1964), which suggested
before Guest that passages such as the one quoted from the Civil Rights Cases could be
read to cover state inaction.
21. There is even some ambiguity on the part of at least three of the justices concerning the potency of the state action doctrine as a limit upon rights created by the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Brennan's opinion in Guest (joined by Chief Justice Warren
and Justice Douglas) carefully distinguishes between a right of equal access to privatelyowned facilities and a right of equal access to state-run facilities, and it places only the
latter behind the shield of the Fourteenth Amendment. 383 U.S. at 774-86 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). On the question of the source of the right to
free interstate travel, however, Justice Brennan gives only three clues to his position: (1)
he differs from Justice Stewart's reasoning; (2) he felt he "need not reach the question
whether the Constitution of its own force [presumably the force of the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment] prohibits private interferences" (id. at 777
n.3.) with the right of interstate travel; and (3) his view on the interstate travel question
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At this point Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis2" was decided, and the
entire Court, including the dissenters,2" was again speaking the language of
state action. The reason for this approach, and the implications of the justices' discussions for the future of the law in this area, can be explained only
after a more complete examination of the impact of the precedents set by
Guest and Jones.
I. United States v. Guest: Frontal Assault

on the State Action Limit
According to Justice Stewart, who wrote the opinion for the Court in
United States v. Guest,2 4 which arose from an indictment for criminal conspiracy to deprive black citizens of their civil rights, the case involved only
the matter of statutory construction; but the concurrences also reached questions of constitutional power.2 5 The statute at issue in Guest, 18 U.S.C.
§ 241,26 had been found by the Court in UnitedStates v. Williams 7 to protect
no Fourteenth Amendment rights because its language clearly applied only
to private conspiracies. The implication at that time was clear: the Fourteenth Amendment created rights enforceable by Congress only against state
officials.2 8 The conclusion of the six concurring justices in Guest was that
section 241 could be constitutionally applied to completely private action
that interfered with Fourteenth Amendment rights.2" This assertion
follows reasoning similar to his argument that Congress has the authority to protect rights
that emanate from, or find their source in, other rights that the Constitution explicitly establishes. Thus, Justice Brennan seems to be saying approximately the following: maybe
the Fourteenth Amendment's privileges and immunities clause protects the right to interstate travel against private interference as well as state interference, but maybe it protects only against the latter. Even if it does only protect against state interference, Congress may legislate to protect against private interference because that type of protection
might facilitate the constitutionally mandated protection. See also Feuerstein, Civil Rights
Crimes and the Federal Power to Punish Private Individualsfor Interference with Federally Secured Rights, 19 VAND. L. REv. 641, 674-75 (1966).

22. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
23. Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall.
24. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
25. 383 U.S. at 781-82 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id.
at 762 (Clark, J., concurring).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970).

27.

341 U.S. 70 (1951).

28. For an argument that this reasoning in Williams did not constitute a binding
precedent because only four of the five justices in the majority adhered to it (the fifth,
Justice Black, took no position on this precise issue), see United States v. Price, 383 U.S.
787, 797-98 (1966).
29. 383 U.S. at 781-84 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part,
joined by Warren, C.J., & Douglas, J.); id. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring, joined by
Black & Fortas, JJ.).
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amounted to overruling, albeit in dicta, the century-old view of the limit on
the powers of Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment, which had been
reiterated as recently as Williams." ° The new rule permitted "Congress to
make laws that it concludes are reasonably necessary to protect a right
created by and arising under [the Fourteenth] Amendment'"'" and allowed
Congress to punish private actions that abridge such a right. The idea that
private action could violate a Fourteenth Amendment right was a major
departure, and it is no accident that Justice Brennan cited as his authority
Justice John Marshall Harlan's 1883 dissent in the Civil Rights Cases.3"
As a result of this departure, the majority in Guest forthrightly announced that the opportunity to travel unimpeded from one part of the
country to another was a basic right of citizenship, a civil right that Congress
could protect against all interference, governmental or private. This congressional power derived either from the Fourteenth Amendment (according
to Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and Douglas)," or from a
combination of the commerce clause, the necessary and proper clause, and
the privileges and immunities clause of article IV (according to Justices
Stewart, White, Clark, Black, and Fortas). 4 The Guest rationale went even
further, however. It would permit Congress to regulate all other interactions
among private individuals that might reasonably be thought to affect free
interstate travel or equal access to public facilities. Into this category might
fall open housing legislation (for access to public schools), hiring quotas for
racial minorities in wholly private companies (ultimately for access to good
public schools by means of access to high priced housing),3" and even access
to private clubs (on the theory that discrimination by such clubs might affect
cross-sectional migration to localities where racially exclusive private clubs
dominate social and economic life).
0

H. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.: Death by Irrelevance
for the State Action Doctrine
Guest still seemed to require that Congress be able to construct a chain.
of plausibility linking its civil rights legislation governing private actions to
the protection of some fundamental right such as the right of interstate
30. The dictum in Guest was adopted shortly thereafter as a rule of law in a majority opinion. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-51 (1966).
31. 383 U.S. at 782 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
32. Id. at 783 n.8 (citing 109 U.S. 3, 54 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
33. 383 U.S. at 782 (Brennan, J.,in an opinion joined by Warren, C.J., &
Douglas, J.).
34. Id. at 746; id. at 761 (Clark, J.,concurring, joined by Black & Fortas, JJ.).
35. Archibald Cox pointed this out in his comment on Guest. See Cox, supra note
14, at 110.
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travel. Yet even this minimal requirement was discarded in Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co.36 This case involved 42 U.S.C. § 1982. 37 In effect, the Court
held that the statute operated as an open housing law applicable to both
private individuals and state officials. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court,
found the statute, as interpreted, to be a constitutional exercise of the powers
of Congress under the Thirteenth Amendment.3 The Thirteenth Amendment includes no references to state action, but four earlier cases interpreting
section 1982 had said that the statute restricted only "governmental action." 3 9 Justice Stewart argued that these earlier statements had all been
dicta, that the Court's present interpretation followed more literally the
wording of the statute, that historical evidence supported this reading, 4 and
that Congress might rationally conclude that a widespread community practice of refusing to sell high-quality housing to Negroes did constitute a
"badge of servitude" within the proscription of the Thirteenth Amendment. 4 '
The extent to which this decision represented a new departure in the
interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment can be appreciated when it is
contrasted with the traditional analysis put forth in the Civil Rights Cases.42
Justice Bradley's majority opinion in those cases readily acknowledged that
the Thirteenth Amendment enabled Congress to legislate directly against
private action; the amendment was said to clothe "Congress with power to
pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of
slavery in the United States."" Only Justice Bradley's treatment of the
question of what constitutes a badge of servitude separates him from the
Jones majority. Justice Bradley posed the question:
36. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
37. The section reads as follows: "All citizens of the United States shall have the
same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982

(1970).
38.

392 U.S. at 437-44.

39. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31 (1948); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323,
331 (1926); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 16-17 (1883); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S.
313, 317-18 (1879).

40. For a debate on this contention, compare C.

FAIRMAN,

RECONSTRUCTION

Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 SuP. CT. REV. 89 with R. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR
AND REUNION: 1864-1888, PART ONE (1971) and Casper,

EQUALITY 52-56 (1960); Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Come Round at

Last, 55 VA. L. REV. 272 (1969); tenBroek, The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171, 174-99 (1951); and Note, Section 1981 and PrivateDiscrimination:An HistoricalJustificationfor a Judicial Trend, 40
1024, 1025-33 (1972).
41: 392 U.S. at 417-39.
42. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
43. Id. at 20.

GEO. WASH. L. REV.
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Can the act of a mere individual, the owner of an inn
refusing the
accommodation, be justly regarded as imposing any badge of slavery or
servitude upon the applicant, or only as inflicting an ordinary civil injury,
. . .presumably subject to redregs by (the] laws [of the State] until the
contrary appears?44

His response was that individual, private discriminations on the basis of race
are not badges of slavery.45 For Justice Bradley, the only situation that
permitted Thirteenth Amendment redress against discrimination was one in
which "the laws themselves make any unjust discrimination"; only then
might the injured party look to the Civil Rights Acts as a means to counteract
unconstitutional state action.4 6 Thus only government-sanctioned racial discrimination could be reached by Congress as a forbidden badge of servitude.
Justice Stewart's opinion in Jones not only eviscerated any traditional
state action requirement from the Thirteenth Amendment, but also breathed
new vigor into the phrase "badge of servitude." According to Justice
Stewart, "Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery. "4 7 Justice
Stewart quoted Justice Bradley in support of the idea that the essence of civil
freedom included having "the same right

.

.

.

to inherit, purchase, lease,

sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens." 4 ' The difference,
of course, was that Justice Bradley meant "right" in the sense of legal
44. Id. at 24.
45. Id. at 25.
46. Id. at 24 (emphasis added). Justice Bradley's understanding of the manner in
which state laws would provide "redress" against these deprivations of rights is illustrated in the following passage: "[C]ivil rights . . .cannot be impaired by the wrongful
acts of individuals, unsupported by State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings. The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such
authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual; an invasion of the
rights of the injured party, it is true, . . . but ifnot sanctioned in some way by the State,
or not done under State authority, his rights remain in full force, and may presumably be
vindicated by resort to the laws of the State for redress. An individual cannot deprive a
man of his right to vote, to hold property, to buy and sell, to sue in the courts, or to be a
witness or juror; he may, by force orfraud, interfere with the enjoyment of a right...
but, unless protected in these wrongful acts by some shield of State law or State authority, he cannot destroy or injure the right .... ." Id. at 17 (emphasis added). This passage makes it clear that Justice Bradley did not view the mere peaceful refusal to sell to or
to buy from an individual as an "interference with the enjoyment of a right." Such interference would apparently require force or fraud and only then would he impose on state
governments the obligation to protect the rights of the victim. In his view, state complicity in the cheating, beating, robbing, or killing of blacks was prohibited by the Fourteenth
Amendment, but tacit governmental toleration of non-fraudulent individual refusals to sell
property to blacks would not affect the matter of civil rights.
47. 392 U.S. at 440.
48. Id. at 441 (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883)). See note 46

supra for Justice Bradley's actual position.
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permission, whereas Justice Stewart construes "right" to embrace a right to
accomplish, assuming that one has the resources, or a right not to be interfered with by any outside agent, public or private. Although Justice Stewart
refrained from revealing the outer limits of what incidents of freedom Congress might choose to guarantee, he described the minimum extent of that
power: "At the very least, the freedom that Congress is empowered to
secure under the Thirteenth Amendment includes the freedom to buy whatever a white man can buy, the right to live wherever a white man can
live." 49 With its decision in Jones the Court announced that the Thirteenth
Amendment gave Congress the power to eliminate racial discrimination in
any area, no matter how local, where buying and selling takes place.
A wide variety of things are bought and sold, including food in private
clubs,5" membership in private clubs,51 and education in private schools."
One might suppose that when Justice Stewart said "whatever a white man
can buy," he meant only goods and not services. This interpretation might
be true if section 1982 stood alone, but it does not. It is accompanied by 42
U.S.C. § 1981, which provides: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory, to make
and enforce contracts. . .. 'I One could not easily maintain that one of
these clauses refers only to state action while the other is not so limited.54
Indeed, the wording of the two statutes is virtually identical. Not long after
the Jones decision, the Supreme Court in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association," which involved suits for declaratory and injunctive
49.

392 U.S. at 443.

50. This implication of the Jones decision was noted long before the Moose Lodge
case arose. See 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1019, 1033 (1969).
51. This implication of Jones was also noted before Moose Lodge. Comment, Association, Privacy, and the Private Club: The Constitutional Conflict, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 460, 461-63 (1970). See also Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Private Club Discrimination, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 595, 604-05.
52. In addition to the cases consolidated in Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586
(1976), in which the Court confronted this particular descendent of Jones, another case
still in the lower courts presents an intriguing variation of the private school question.
Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, reported in Tampa Tribune, May 28, 1975, at 10A,
col. 1, rejected the argument that a "religion" of white supremacy can be the basis of a
First Amendment exemption for religious private schools from governmental desegregation orders. Whether this decision will be viewed by the Supreme Court as closer to the
Moose Lodge situation or to that of Runyon remains to be determined; the Supreme Court
in Runyon explicitly left this question open. 96 S. Ct. at 2593 n.6.

53.

42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).

54. Justice White, who dissented in Jones, makes a valiant effort to distinguish sections 1981 and 1982 with regard to state action in his Runyon dissent. See 96 S. Ct. at
2605 (White, J., dissenting).
55. 410 U.S. 431 (1973). -
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relief against racially discriminatory membership policies by a community
recreation association, established that sections 1981 and 1982 are, in fact,
to be construed similarly;5 6 a conclusion the court has reaffirmed. 5"

I1. The Stage for Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis
By 1972 the Court had shown its willingness to breach traditional state
action limits on Congress' powers, although its members chose different
approaches. Justice Brennan preferred the approach he had enunciated in
Guest, an approach reiterated in his dissent in Adickes v. S. H. Kress Co. ,58
which dealt with the meaning of the phrase "custom, or usage, of any state"
found in 42 U.S.C. § 1983." 9 Justice Harlan's opinion for the court interpreted the phrase to require at least some connivance on the part of state
officials. 6" Justice Brennan, however, contended that Congress had in that
phrase outlawed every widespread community practice that deprived people
of civil rights, regardless of governmental involvement in the practice. 1
Justice Douglas agreed with Justice Brennan's conclusion, but he chose the
Jones rationale as his vehicle for reaching that point.6"
The rest of the Court demonstrated in a 1971 case, Griffin v. Breckenridge,3 that they, too, preferred to hurdle old state action obstacles by using
56. Id. at 440. One commentator argues that this was clearly implied as early as
Jones. Note, Section 1981 and Private Groups: The Right to Discriminate versus Freedomfrom Discrimination, 84 YALE L.J. 1441, 1447-48 n.36 (1975).
57. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 (1976); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975).
58. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
59. The full section reads as follows: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory. subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). One commentator reads
the Adickes case as a pre-Moose Lodge return to the state action doctrine. Bassett, The
Reemergence of the "State Action" Requirement in Race Relations Cases, 22 CATH.
U.L. REV. 39 (1972). Actually, however, Adickes should be read as a matter of statutory
interpretation and not as a question of the constitutional power of Congress. It was obvious by 1970 that the entire Court believed Congress could choose to permit a civil remedy
for private denial of restaurant service on racial grounds. Kress, after all, was part of a
national chain, and its lunch counter was obviously covered by the 1964 Public Accommodations Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1970). The question was simply whether
Congress had permitted such a remedy in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
60. 398 U.S. at 167-69, 171-72. Justice Harlan notes explicitly that certain forms
of police inaction can constitute state "enforcement" of a "custom." Id. at 172.
61. 398 U.S. at 191 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
62. Id. at 185-86 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
63. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
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the Thirteenth Amendment approach of Jones. In Griffin the Court reversed
a 1951 ruling that the clause in 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) providing a civil
remedy for conspiracies to deprive others "of equal protection of the laws,
or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws" was implicitly limited
to conspiracies involving governmental authority.64 A unanimous Court,
speaking through Justice Stewart, held that the Thirteenth Amendment authorized Congress to reach any activities, private or governmental, that
"aimed at depriving [Negro citizens] of the basic rights that the law secures
to all free men.65 The decision explicitly added to the constitutional arsenal
the weapon of congressional power to protect interstate commerce, a line of
reasoning to which Justice Harlan alone took exception. By their concurrence in the argument concerning the basic rights that the law secures to all
free citizens, the entire Supreme Court endorsed an approach that was almost word-for-word a recapitulation of the dissent of Justice John Marshall
Harlan in the Civil Rights Cases.6
In a small but portentous passage, the Griffin opinion went even
further. It had been the general understanding ever since the early interpretations in the Slaughterhouse Cases6" and the Civil Rights Cases that the
power of Congress under the Thirteenth Amendment reached only Negroes,
as descendents of slaves, and other persons in positions of servitude.6" The
Fourteenth Amendment's power, by contrast, has been commonly regarded
as reaching all invidious, class-based discriminations. 9 In his opinion for
the Court in Griffin Justice Stewart suggested that the traditional limitation
64. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
65. 403 U.S. at 105 (emphasis added).
66. See 109 U.S. at 26-62 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
67. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
68. Id. at 72.
69. The Slaughterhouse Cases viewed even the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause as limited to blacks. See 83 U.S. at 81. But the Civil Rights Cases altered
the precedent shortly thereafter: "Many wrongs may be obnoxious to the prohibitions of
the Fourteenth Amendment which are not, in any just sense, incidents or elements of
slavery. . . . What is called class legislation would belong to this category, and would
be obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment, but would not necessarily
be so to the Thirteenth, when not involving the idea of the subjection of one man to
another. The Thirteenth Amendment has respect, not to distinctions of race, or class, or
color, but to slavery. The Fourteenth Amendment extends its protection to races and
classes, and prohibits any State legislation which has the effect of denying to any race or
class, or to any individual, the equal protection of the laws." 109 U.S. at 23-24. For the
standard view, see Note, The Desegregation of Private Schools: Is Section 1981 the Answer?, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1147, 1166 (1973). See also Note, The "New" Thirteenth
Amendnent: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1294, 1309 (1969); Note, Jones
v. Mayer: The Thirteenth Amendment and The Federal Anti-Discrimination Laws, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 1019, 1025-26 (1969).
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of the Thirteenth Amendment's reach to protect only blacks might no longer
be in effect; he averred that Congress might have a Thirteenth Amendment
power to remedy "perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory" actions even without racial motivation."0 Thus, the net result of Jones
and Griffin on the civil rights power of Congress was that they transformed
the Thirteenth Amendment into a Fourteenth Amendment minus the traditional state action restraint. This was the unanimous position of the early
Burger Court before 1972.1
A number of legal questions now hovered like clouds on the horizon.
One hazy area involved the two amendments' own force. Jones had not
clarified whether the Thirteenth Amendment by itself prohibits badges of
slavery as well as actual slavery." What effect the Fourteenth Amendment
has by itself was still subject to interpretive constraints imposed by the state
action doctrine. Commentators had been arguing for years that the state
action requirement was in one sense too broad: government, through licensing, regulating, enforcing, and funding is involved in virtually every aspect
of interpersonal life. But if only minimal government involvement were to
be made the test of state action, then no sphere of private life would be free
from the mandated equality of the Fourteenth Amendment.73
The second cloud on the legal horizon was the unresolved question of
how far into the sphere of private discrimination sections 1981 and 1982
should extend. Did the section 1982 "right to buy and sell" cover the
purchase of food and drink in private clubs? Did the section 1981 "right to
contract" cover contracts for membership in private clubs or for services in
private schools? Did it cover marriage contracts?" Some of these questions
70. 403 U.S. at 102.
71. This was the Burger Court before the ascension of Justices Rehnquist, Powell,
and Stevens to the Court. Although Justices White and Rehnquist later dissented in
Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586 (1976), they did so on the grounds of statutory interpretation, explicitly acknowledging that Congress does have constitutional power under
the Thirteenth Amendment to ban racial discrimination by private schools. Id. at 2605 n.2
(White, J., dissenting).
72. 392 U.S. at 439.
73. This point has frequently been made in conjunction with an argument for adopting a public-private test to replace the state-private test. See, e.g.. Black, The Supreme
Court 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 100-08 (1967); Carl, Reflections on the "Sitins," 46 CORNELL L.Q. 444, 447-48, 454-55 (1961); Henkin, Shelly v. Kraemer: Notes
for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 486-505 (1962); Silard, A Constitutional
Forecast: Demise of the State Action Limit on The Equal Protection Guarantee, 66
COLUM. L. REV. 855, 869-71 (1966); Note, Constitutional Law-The Private Club:
Another Reprieve, 27 ARK. L. REV. 146, 150 (1973); Note, Developing Legal Vistas for
the Discouragementof Private Club Discrimination, 58 IOWA L. REN'. 108 (1972).
74. Antimiscegenation laws had been struck down on pure Fourteenth Amendment
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may seem farfetched, but it was only five years before Moose Lodge No. 107
v. Irvis75 that a commentator confidently asserted that no black "has ever
tried to use constitutional law to get '7into.
. . any private club" and that this
6
continue.
"certainly
would
pattern

IV. Moose Lodge: Rebirth of a
Public-Private Sphere Doctrine
After being refused service in the bar and dining room of a Moose
Lodge chapter, K. Leroy Irvis, a black guest of a lodge member, sought an
injunction against the lodge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 7 The issue presented
to the Court was whether Pennsylvania's issuance of a liquor license to the
racially discriminatory lodge constituted action "under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of [a) state" that caused persons
"to be subjected . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. . ." The Court, includgrounds in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). But the private action, for instance, of
a parent trying to prevent a child from marrying into a different race might conceivably be
challenged in a court on section 1981 grounds. The original version of section 1981, in
the 1866 statute, was attacked on these grounds in Congress, but it is not clear whether the
speaker who opposed the bill was deliberately exaggerating its impact. CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., Ist Sess. 505 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Johnson).
75. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
76. Black, supra note 14, at 101.
77. The complete section reads as follows: "Civil actionfor deprivation of rights.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other persons within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress." 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1970).
78. Moose Lodge also presented two other issues, neither of which is treated in
detail in this article. One was the question of whether Pennsylvania's Liquor Control
Board regulation, 40 LIQ. CONT. BD.
5.81 (1972), which required that "every club
licensee shall adhere to all of the provisions of its constitution and by-laws," could be
enjoined with respect to the racial discrimination provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
Court held that it could be so enjoined because racial discrimination may not be enforced
by any agency of the state. 407 U.S. at 177-79.
The second issue was the question of whether Irvis had standing to challenge Moose
Lodge membership policies, as well as their guest-serving policies, in light of the fact that
he had never applied for membership. The Court's answer was twofold: (1) at the time
the district court took the case, Irvis did not have standing as to the membership policy;
but (2) by the time the Supreme Court reviewed the case Irvis did have standing to request an injunction against enforcement of the state liquor board rule requiring licensees
to follow their own membership rules. The change of standing was due to a change in the
lodge's by-laws between the district court decision and the Supreme Court decision. By
1972 the Moose lodge had restricted its guest facilities to "persons who are eligible for
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ing the dissenters, treated the case as though the only privilege or immunity
potentially at stake was one secured by the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In other words, for purposes of this case, they
treated section 1983 as though its reach went no further than the Fourteenth
Amendment would by itself. They treated it as a statute that simply created
judicial remedies for Fourteenth Amendment violations."
It is true that the privilege of which Irvis claimed deprivation was that
of equal protection of the laws.8" He indicated additional legal privileges,
however, including the Thirteenth Amendment right to be free of badges and
incidents of servitude. He alleged that "the invidious social discrimination
practiced by private clubs" was such a badge and that such discrimination
therefore violated the Constitution.8 1 Not only did the Court ignore this
claim, but Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion stated exactly the opposite;
he characterized Irvis as "conceding the right of private clubs to choose
members upon a discriminatory basis."8 2 In fact, Irvis presented two arguments against that so-called right. The first was based solely on a Thirteenth
Amendment argument. The second was based on section 1981; Irvis pointed
out that the relationship between an individual and his club was a "contractual one (dues exchanged for facilities)" and therefore could "reasonably be
argued" to be subject to section 1981.83
While it is true that this discussion of the Thirteenth Amendment and of
section 1981 arose tangentially, as a means of rebutting the claim by Moose
Lodge that the private club exemption of the 1964 Civil Rights Act84 demonstrated the judgment of Congress that private social clubs had a constitutionally protected right to discriminate, the Court's treatment of the issue
was unusual. On the one hand, the Court denied the existence of the argumembership in the fraternity," thereby combining guest discrimination and membership
discrimination into a single policy. 407 U.S. at 165-71, 177-79. For a discussion of the
standing issue, see Comment, Constitutional Law--Equal Protection-State Liquor
License Scheme Does not Sufficiently Implicate State in Private Club's Discrimination to
Violate the Equal Protection Clause of the FourteenthAmendment, 26 RUTGERS L. REV.
888, 890-94 (1973).
79. 407 U.S. at 165, 171-72, 173, 177, 179, 183, 185-86, 190.
80. Id. at 165.
81. Brief for Appellee at 109, Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163
(1972). Counsel conceded that there might be First Amendment limits, to the reach of the
Thirteenth Amendment in the matter of associations, but argued that First Amendment
exemptions would not apply "where the purposes of the club are fraternal" (presumably
as distinguished from political).
82. 407 U.S. at 171.
83. Brief for Appellee at 110, Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163
(1972).
84. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000e-15 (1970).
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ment, thereby distorting the position of Irvis; on the other hand, the Court
appeared to be looking ahead to potential legal actions that might arise under
section 1981 itself, actions that would not require any finding of state involvement. This was the first case presented to the Court involving discrimination by a bona fide private club, and the section 1981 implications were
elaborated in counsel's written briefs. Not only is it obvious that the Court
must have been aware of the potential impact of section 1981 on private
clubs, but a close examination of its decision reveals that it managed to
establish the groundwork for future decisions on the subject without once
mentioning the existence of section 1981.
The majority treated the case as presenting no more than a state action
question. Justice Rehnquist addressed the question whether the granting of a
liquor license to this racially discriminatory private club constituted enough
state involvement in private discriminatory conduct to contravene the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. His manner of answering
that query had a number of significant implications for future section 1981
litigation even though he was silent about that statute.
Rehnquist began his argument by reiterating the traditional state action
doctrine: he cited the Civil Rights Cases," Shelley v. Kraemer ,86 and Burton
v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority8" in support of the principle that the courts
recognize an "essential dichotomy" between discriminatory action by a
state and discrimination by a private party.8 8 He then devoted five paragraphs, covering almost four full pages of his six-page opinion, to distinguishing the Moose Lodge situation from that presented in Burton.9 Justice
Rehnquist reads Burton as establishing the rule that unless a state agency
"insinuates itself' into the activities of a private entity, the Fourteenth
Amendment does not prohibit racial discrimination by the private entity.
Accordingly, he examines the indicia of state-private "interdependence"
peculiarly present in the discriminatory action of the restaurant in Burton,
including the facts that (1) it was located on state-owned property, part of
which was used to perform "essential governmental functions"; (2) the
costs of acquiring, constructing, and maintaining the building were shared
by the private restaurant and the governmental agency through a combina85.
86.
87.
88.

109 U.S.
334 U.S.
365 U.S.
407 U.S.

3 (1883).
1 (1948).
715 (1961).
at 172.

89. Id. at 172-75. The remaining two pages of the opinion dealt with the question
of Pennsylvania's Liquor Control Board regulations. See note 78 supra. There is even an
additional paragraph that arguably distinguishes the restaurant in Burton from the bar in
Moose Lodge; it describes the case of Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
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tion of public funds and governmental bonds to be repaid with the income
derived from lessees such as the restaurant; (3) the restaurant and parking
authority benefitted mutually from.the conveniences each afforded the customers of the other; and (4) the restaurant could be expected to reap the
benefit of a lower rent as a result of the tax-exempt status of the parking
authority building.9"
Significantly, after summarizing this distinction of Burton with a
statement concerning the "symbiotic relationship" of mutual benefits that
was present there, Justice Rehnquist distinguished with considerable emphasis the private nature of the Moose lodge from the public nature of the
restaurant in Wilmington:
UnlikeBurton the Moose Lodge building is located on land owned by it,
not by any public authority. Far from apparently holding itself out as a
place of public accommodation, Moose Lodge quite ostentatiously proclaims the fact that it is not open to the public at large. Nor is it located
and operated in such surroundings that although private in name, it
discharges a function or performs a service that would otherwise in all
likelihood be performed by the State. In short, while Eagle was apublic
restaurantin apublicbuilding, Moose Lodge is aprivatesocial club in a
private building.91
While Justice Rehnquist ostensibly based this decision on the state action
doctrine that the Civil Rights Cases of 1883 established,9 2 nothing similar to
the above quotation could have appeared in the 1883 majority opinion. That
opinion declared unconstitutional, on the basis of the state action doctrine, a
law forbidding racial discrimination in public accommodations. The first
sentence of the above quotation, in referring to the ownership of the building
by a "public authority," seems to be referring to the material that preceded
the quote, which described the symbiotic private-governmental relationship. "Public" there means simply state-owned and state-managed. But
'Justice Rehnquist shifted to a second meaning for the word "public," as in
"public accommodation," or "public restaurant." In those contexts, he
obviously means "public" in the sense of "open to the public at large," or
''open to the buying public." The Fourteenth Amendment covers public
accommodations aided by the state in certain ways; it does not cover private
clubs aided by the state in certain ways.
By virtue of the above-quoted passage from Justice Rehnquist, the new
state action doctrine now contains a version of the public sphere doctrine
that was advocated by Justice John Marshall Harlan in his dissent in 1883
90.

407 U.S. at 174-75.

91. Id. at 175 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 172.
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and by Justice Douglas to some extent in his opinion for the Court in Evans
v. Newton93 in 1966. The Court's new version is as follows: Some kinds of
government involvement in racial discrimination by private actors do present sufficient state action to be forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. If
governmental action substantially benefiting the discriminator takes place in
the public sphere, the discrimination is forbidden by the equal protection
clause. By "public sphere," the justices mean that the discriminator is either
acting in the world of commerce, where his offer to sell or buy is open to the
public at large, or he is performing some function or providing some service
that the government ordinarily would provide. On the other hand, the state
action standard is much more stringent than mere governmental aid if the
discriminator is acting in the private sphere," that is, in the realm of private
home life, where the state provides such essential services as electricity,
water, police and fire protection,9 5 or in the realm of private associational
life, where the state provides such essential services as liquor licenses, as in
Moose Lodge," or perhaps special hunting or fishing privileges. When the
discriminator is acting wholly within the private sphere, for instance, in
admitting guests into his home or in selecting members for his club, the
93. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
94. Justice Rehnquist's comment that the quota system of Pennsylvania "falls far
short of conferring upon club licensees a monopoly in the dispensing of liquor" (407
U.S. at 177) may seem to call into question any assertion that the quality or amount of
governmental aid is not the state action test for discrimination within the private sphere.
He certainly implies that if the state did grant a liquor-dispensing monopoly to private
clubs, and if most or all of them excluded blacks, then conferral of the monopoly would
be forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. His statement and its obvious implication
can, however, be reconciled with the author's analysis by the following consideration.
According to Anglo-American tradition (with the brief exception of the Prohibition interlude), and by contemporary American practice, liquor is bought and sold in public accommodations. If a state were to mandate that liquor could be bought and sold only in
licensed private clubs, the Court might plausibly reason that within the American cultural
context such singling out of those clubs imposed on them the function of a public accommodation and thereby rendered them at least quasi-public accommodations. Given the
admitted indispensability of liquor licenses to the operation of private social clubs (see
note 96 infra), this "enforcement" analysis seefis to give a better account than a sizeof-benefit analysis would give of the distinction Justice Rehnquist is drawing.
95. 407 U.S. at 173. A later case suggests that even in the public sphere (specifically in the case of a private school performing the public function of education) such
services as water, electricity, and police protection, although essential, are not to be
viewed as substantial government benefits. Perhaps this is because they are indiscriminately available to all persons. The Court distinguishes textbook gifts to racially discriminatory private schools from these generalized services that government provides to
all persons. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 465 (1973).
96. According to Justice Douglas, "Moose Lodge itself concedes [that] without a
liquor license a fraternal organization would be hard pressed to survive." 407 U.S. at 183
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court will permit the Fourteenth Amendment to reach only state
action thatforces him to discriminate on the basis of race.9"
Moose Lodge is the first case that involved racial discrimination in this
private sphere, 98 and the Court, in effect, accentuated the limits of the
private sphere concept by granting an injunction against the enforcement of
the Pennsylvania Liquor Board regulation that commands private clubs to
obey their own membership requirements.9 9 The Court granted this injunction on the basis of a rule it found in such precedents as Shelley v. Kraemer...
and Robinson v. Florida."I The Court spoke of the rule as though it were a
rule against all state enforcement of private discrimination;"'2 but it is evident from the context of this case, as well as from his reference to "police
protection,"' '03 that Justice Rehnquist did not mean that Moose Lodge could
not have invoked police aid to eject Irvis as a trespasser. His reference to
"state sanctions to enforce" private racial discrimination really meant the
use of state sanctions to force someone against his will to discriminate
racially. This, evidently, is his reading of Shelley regarding the private
sphere.' 0 4
How does Justice Rehnquist view the public sphere? He said that the
Eagle restaurant in Burton was a "public restaurant in a public building.""'
To be a public restaurant is to belong to the public sphere, and to rent space
97. The Supreme Court did permit the Fourteenth Amendment to reach another form
of state involvement in a private club, but it did so only by refraining from undoing the
action of a lower court. Oregon State Elks v. Falkenstein, 409 U.S. 1099 (1973). In that
case the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal from a decision prohibiting tax exemptions to
racially discriminatory clubs. The Supreme Court, however, could approve the Oregon
decision according to the doctrine of public sphere-private sphere by the following reasoning: the acceptance by a private club of a tax exemption as a charitable, educational,
or otherwise eleemosynary institution is an admission by that club that it does perform a
public function. This puts the club in the public sphere, and because the tax exemption
constitutes significant state aid the club is forbidden to discriminate on the basis of race.
98. See note 78 supra. Although Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), was
treated as an equal protection case, it can also be analyzed along these lines.
99. 407 U.S. at 177-79.
100. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
101.. 378 U.S. 153 (1964). These cases dealt with the public sphere, but Justice
Rehnquist emphasized their state-enforcement aspects in applying them to the private
sphere. See also Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
102. 407 U.S. at 179.
103. Id. at 173.
104. See note 98 supra. Justice Rehnquist's approach to the enforcement of membership rules of private clubs and to police protection (against, presumably, the crimes of
trespass, burglary, and so on) directly follows the dissent of Justice Black in Bell v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 318 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting, joined by Harlan & White,
JJ.). But Justice Rehnquist expressly limited his ruling to a private club, as distinguished
from a public restuarant. 407 U.S. at 172, 175.
105. 407 U.S. at 175.
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in a public building is to receive certain benefits from the government. But
there are other possible ways for public accommodations to receive benefits
from the government besides renting space in a state-owned building that
contains a parking lot. Those other forms of benefits from the government
are both more ubiquitous and more essential to the survival of the public
accommodations than the benefits cited by Justice Rehnquist. Significantly,
Justice Rehnquist simply stressed the number and value of mutual benefits in
describing the forbidden symbiotic relationship of Burton. He omitted
another aspect that had been stressed in Burton: symptoms of governmental
entwinement in the operations of the restaurant-for example, the fact that
the state ownership of the building was visibly and prominently displayed by
the flying of a state flag from the roof.' In other words, theBurton opinion
had relied on two rather separate arguments: (1) the interdependence of the
restaurant and the state parking facility, on which Justice Rehnquist focused
in Moose Lodge, and (2) the fact that the state had placed its "power,
property and prestige"' 0 7 behind this racially discriminatory restaurant,
which Justice Rehnquist ignored. Justice Rehnquist's summarizing remark
regarding a "public restaurant in a public building" implies that the state
action test for the public sphere relies simply on the quantity and quality of
benefits the public accommodation is receiving from the state. On the surface this does not seem very different from the state action tests of the past.
Any attempt to apply this test, however, leads to rather non-traditional
results.
Exploration of the possible distinctions that Justice Rehnquist might
have been drawing between "the benefit of locating in a building owned by
the state-created parking authority"' 0 8 and the usual benefits that public
accommodations receive from the government-e.g., police and fire protection, water, electricity, and a license to operate-yield very frustrating
results. 0 9 Are the benefits of lowered rent and an increased number of
customers any more valuable to a restaurant than such ordinary benefits as
police and fire protection, water, and electricity? Clearly not. Were the
benefits in Burton any more essential to the character of a restuarant's
operation than the ordinary government benefit of a license to operate?
106. 365 U.S. at 720. The entwinement argument is made explicit in Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court in Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966). In Moose
Lodge, only Justice Brennan's dissent (joined by Justice Marshall) focused on this governmental entwinement argument. 407 U.S. at 184. Justice Douglas' dissent, on the other
hand, essentially followed Justice Rehnquist's approach but simply applied the degree-ofgovernment-benefit test more strictly than did the majority. Id. at 179-83.
107. 365 U.S. at 725.
108. 407 U.S. at 175.
109. Id. at 172-73.
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Hardly. Should the essential distinction be between the government's reciprocal dependence on the restaurant on the one hand or simply the restaurant's dependence on the parking facility on the other? Perhaps, but in so
doing one ignores a whole body of law beginning with the Court's decision
in Munn v. Illinois."' It is a firmly entrenched legal principle that government depends upon a wide variety of private business to carry out important
public interest functions. Consequently, the world of commerce has been
subjected to government regulation from the time of the adoption of the
Constitution. "'
Is it a crucial distinction that the restaurant in Burton was being
uniquely favored by the government, singled out by the state from among
similar public accommodations to receive special benefits? Although this
suggestion has some plausibility, momentary reflection yields the conclusion that a great many public accommodations receive benefits quite similar
to those received by the Eagle restaurant. Any store, restaurant, or place of
employment within convenient walking distance of the Wilmington Parking
Authority received the benefit of extra customers (or extra potential employees) that the proximity of the parking facility conferred on the Eagle
restaurant. Every restaurant or other public accommodation that rents space
on tax-exempt property belonging to churches, art museums, historical associations, hospitals, charitable associations, and so on, receives the presumed lower rent benefit that the Eagle restaurant received. 2
The interdependence of government and public businesses, and of government and institutions performing a public function, is so thorough that
Justice Rehnquist's attempt to portray certain governmentally conferred benefits as more special and therefore more significant than others simply
breaks down in practice. In effect, afterMoose Lodge, all businesses that are
open to the public must abide by the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition of
racial discrimination.
V. Runyon v. McCrary and its Immediate Predecessors:
Adolescence of the Public-Private
Sphere Doctrine
A.

Predecessors
As the Supreme Court began to deal with the question of racially

110. 94 U.S. 113 (1877). See also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
111. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. Judicial roots of the doctrine that the world of
commerce is part of the sphere of civic rights reach back at least as far as Corfield v.
Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
112. Some federal courts have declared that direct tax-exemptions to racially discriminatory private clubs violate the Fourteenth Amendment. See note 97 supra.
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discriminatory private schools, the Court's state action framework of
analysis became increasingly strained. Although in the private school cases
of 1973 and 1974"1 the Court continued to follow the ostensible Moose
Lodge approach of maintaining a distinction between general governmental
benefits and special ones, what actually transpired in the decisions belies the
Court's state action language. InNorwood v. Harrison,114 on the basis of the
Fourteenth Amendment alone, the Court declared unconstitutional a system
of state grants of free textbooks to all children in accredited schools, as
applied to schools that practice racial discrimination. The majority denied
that it was reading the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit "any form of state
service that benefits private schools said to be racially discriminatory."I" It
singled out as areas not covered by its ruling the "generalized services
government might provide to schools in common with others" such as the
necessities of electricity, water, and police and fire protection." 6 Nevertheless, the Court made it clear that it was concerned with the public function
being served by private schools for it characterized the private schools as a
potential route back to the segregationist dual school system: "A State's
constitutional obligation requires it to steer clear, not only of operating the
old dual system of racially segregated schools, but also of giving significant
aid to institutions that practice racial or other individious discrimination. "17
The Court warned that "a state may not induce, encourage or promote
private persons to accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish."" '
Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to locate the line that the Court
attempted to draw between generalized governmental services and special
governmental aid to a discriminatory public function institution. In
Norwood, the state was not favoring discriminatory schools any more than
non-discriminatory schools. The textbook aid program was no less
generalized than the state's program for licensing accredited schools. Yet
the Court did not go so far as to forbid the accrediting of racially discriminatory schools. Why is accreditation a less significant aid to the discriminatory school than the grant of free textbooks? When textbooks were
given as freely to non-discriminatory schools as to discriminatory ones, how
was the Court able to argue that the aid had "a significant tendency to
facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination"?" 9 Surely the
113. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974); Norwood v. Harrison,
413 U.S. 455 (1973).
114. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
115. Id.at 465.
116. Id.
117. Id.at 467.
118. Id. at 465.
119. Id.at 466.
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textbooks helped the discriminatory schools no less than the liquor license
had helped Moose Lodge; and in neither case did the governmental aid
promote discrimination as such. The pivotal difference between the two
cases seems to be that the Court viewed Moose Lodge as genuinely within
the private sphere, whereas it viewed the racially segregated private schools
as performing an important public function.
In 1974, in Gilmore v. City of Montgomery,120 the Court again claimed
it was distinguishing between special government favors and generalized
government services to racially segregated private schools. The Court held
that the granting of exclusive use of government owned recreational
facilities to such schools, even for limited time periods, was properly enjoined on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. The Court was not prepared to
concede, however, on the meager factual record before it that access by
racially discriminatory groups to governmental recreational facilities on a
non-exclusive basis, in company with the general public, should immediately be enjoined.' 2 ' As a result of this case, persons who are affiliated
with discriminatory private groups can have the ordinary access that is
available to members of the general public to such municipal facilities as
parks, playgrounds, athletic facilities, amphitheaters, museums, and
zoos,1 2 just as they can be provided with electricity, water, and police and
fire protection without a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." 3 The
Court reserved judgment on specific situations involving non-exclusive access to city recreational facilities by discriminatory private schools on an
organized basis. The Court suggested that participation in athletic tournaments by segregated private schools in conjunction with desegregated public
and private schools might violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 24 How can
this be reconciled with the Court's belief that allowing student groups from
segregated private schools to tour zoos or museums, as other groups do,
would not violate the Fourteenth Amendment? The Court seemed to find a
distinction between access that would be permitted to schools qua schools,
which would be forbidden to a discriminatory school, and access that would
be available to any group, school or otherwise, which would not be forbidden. One cannot be certain of this, however, because the justices explicitly
reserved judgment until a more concrete case came before them. 2 '
120. 417 U.S. 566 (1974).
121. Id. at 570.
122. Id. at 574.
123. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 465 (1973); Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972).
124. 417 U.S. at 569-72.
125. Id. at 570. Justice Brennan would create a principle separating those facilities
that "enable private segregated schools to duplicate public school operations at public ex-
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The Court drew an important distinction in Gilmore by pointedly observing that private schools were to be treated differently from other private
organizations, such as social clubs, for the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment."2 6 Although the Court itemized a number of hypothetical situations in which allowing private schools to use city facilities would be forbidden, it hesitated to be specific about private clubs, saying: "The problem of
private group use is much more complex."' 27 Thus, although the Court in
Norwood and Gilmore spoke in terms of the state action doctrine and
claimed that it was forbidding the granting of significant state aid, as distinguished from generalized governmental services, to racial discriminators,
the Court was in fact paying considerable attention to the public nature of the
function being performed by those discriminators who were receiving the
services.
The ubiquity of state regulation, the abundance of governmentally conferred benefits upon private enterprises, and the many instances of interdependence of governmental and non-governmental activity all render the state
action test both impractical and obsolete. Aware of these difficulties, and yet
concerned with protecting the spheres of private home life and private associational life from the powerful, leveling sweep of the equal protection
clause, Justice Rehnquist and the rest of the Moose Lodge majority cut the
state action doctrine in two. The first half of the doctrine applies to public
accommodations or to entities carrying on "a function or. . . service that
would otherwise in all likelihood be performed by the State.'"' This part of
the doctrine appears in the mutual benefits test of Burton and reaches, in
practice, virtually all public accommodations. This interpretation, although
a novel view of the equal protection clause, is essentially a moot one bepense" (e.g., playgrounds) from those facilities that "private schools are not likely to
maintain" (e.g., zoos or museums). Id. at 577-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Marshall, White, and Douglas would flatly bar use of city-owned recreational facilities by
segregated schools on an organized basis, as part of the school's own program. Id. at
576-77 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 581-82 (White &
Douglas, JJ., concurring).
126. 417 U.S. at 572-74.
127. Id. at 572. It is worth noting that the one hypothetical example the Court gave
of probably unconstitutional use of recreational facilities by a private group was one that
could be said to constitute "a vestige of the type of state-sponsored racial segregation in
public recreation facilities" that is traditionally forbidden. See id. at 572, 574. Only Justice Brennan (who dissented in Moose Lodge) made an unequivocal statement regarding
the use of city facilities by segregated non-school private groups. He asserted that the
"C exclusive use' of recreational facilities by such groups" must be enjoined. Id. at 580.
The majority went so far as to say that such use would present a stronger case for injunction than if the facilities were "simply available to all comers." Id. at 574.
128. 407 U.S. at 175.
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cause of recent re-interpretations of sections 1981 and 1982.19 Those statutes prohibit discrimination in the public sphere of buying, selling, and
contracting; Justice Rehnquist's so-called state action rule seems to require
the same, but does so on the basis of the equal protection clause. What is far
from moot, however, is what Justice Rehnquist's Moose Lodge decision did
to the second half of the state action doctrine that applies to the sphere of
private life. The licensing of home incinerators, automobiles, or guns, for
example, indicates that the government that regulates, grants bpefits, and
even creates situations of interdependence is almost as omnipresent in the
private sphere as it is in the public sphere. But the amount of governmental
involvement, even when it is as detailed as the daily supervision of a liquor
licensee, is not to be the test for invoking the equal protection clause if the
private sphere is concerned. There the Fourteenth Amendment can be invoked only to prevent governmental compulsion of racial discrimination. 3 '
Thus, the court's application of the amount-of-government-benefits test to
private school discrimination in 1973 and 1974 was an indication that such
schools were to be treated as part of the public rather than the private sphere.
13
Those cases foreshadowed the Court's decision in Runvon v. McCrary. 1
Runyon provides a new and important link in the public sphereprivate sphere analysis. By delineating a private realm in which the liberty
of the Fourteenth Amendment would prevail over the same amendment's
equal protection elements, the Moose Lodge case had charted the limits of
recent decisions extending the command of racial equality explicit in the
Fourteenth Amendment. A comparable statement was needed to pinpoint the
limits of sections 1981 and 1982 in light of the fact that the reach of those
statutes had been so greatly extended by the Court in Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co.13 and Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association."'
That comparable statement was provided in Runyon.
129. Justice Rehnquist, when he dissented with Justice White in Runyon, did not
apply the implications of his own Moose Lodge reasoning. Even following his assumption
in Runyon that section 1981 does not apply to genuinely private actors, he nonetheless
could have argued that so-called private schools are not free of the state action taint. In
fact, many of them are public accommodations; they receive important governmental benefits in the form of accreditation and compulsory school attendance laws and they perform important governmental functions. By ignoring the relevance of his own Moose
Lodge interpretation of the Burton and Evans precedents, Justice Rehnquist ignored some
pressing questions. By contrast, Justice Stewart's majority opinion stressed that these
schools avertise to the public and are open to the public. 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (1976).
130. 407 U.S. at 177-79.
131. 96 S.Ct. 2586 (1976).
132. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
133. 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
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B.

Runyon v. McCrary
Mr. and Mrs. Runyon operated Bobbe's Private School, located in the
state of Virginia. Michael McCrary, a black child denied admission to the
school solely on racial grounds, sued on the basis of section 1981 guarantees
protecting his parents' right to contract. In holding that section 1981 encompassed private schools by mandating that "all persons shall have the same
right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white

citizens," the Supreme Court had two choices vis-i-vis, the precedent of
Moose Lodge. The Court could have said nothing, leaving room for the
assumption that Mr. Irvis had simply relied on the wrong statute for his
claim and thereby opening the floodgates for new torrents of litigation
against discriminatory private clubs. Or the Court could have attempted to
distinguish the situation of a genuinely private social club from that of a
so-called private school. The latter course required some explication of the
limits a private sphere-public sphere analysis places on the powers of
Congress under the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Court provided such an
explication. Instead of examining the question of what degree of governmental involvement supported the challenged discrimination, the Court
in Runyon focused on the new question, whether so-called private schools
are really private.
While neither Justice Stewart in his majority opinion nor Justice Powell
in his concurring opinion openly argued that the public sphere-private
sphere analysis must replace the state action doctrine, each did attempt to
distinguish two kinds of private, that is, non-governmental areas: those
private areas into which the duties of Congress under the Thirteenth
Amendment do extend (the public sphere), and those private areas into
which Congress should not intrude (the private sphere). Justice Stewart's
opinion focused more narrowly on the precedents shaping those constitutional rights that create the private sphere (the First Amendment right of
association, and the familial right of privacy) while Justice Powell chose to
explicate just what constitutes the sphere of private life. Both opinions mark
important advances from the initial steps taken in the Moose Lodge decision;
both discard the misleading terminology of state action and instead focus on
the crucial decision of where to draw the line separating private from public
life.
Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court firmly established some basic
premises implicit in the budding public-private sphere doctrine. First, the
Court reiterated the established principle that an organization operating in
the world of commerce, open to all members of the public who can pay, is
operating in the public sphere that Congress may regulate under the Thir-
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teenth Amendment.13 4 Neither the lack of governmental involvement in
those organizations nor the fact that those organizations are selective merely
on the basis of race exempts them from the reach either of the Thirteenth
Amendment or of sections 1981 and 1982.135 Second, Justice Stewart outlined a number of examples of the private sphere that would be placed by
constitutional guarantee beyond the reach of congressional power to enforce
134. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1976); Tillman
v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1974); Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Certain
anomalies may appear to arise out of the fact that this author refers to the public sphere as
the realm of citizen life; the reader may object that the Thirteenth Amendment gave
blacks only freedom, not citizenship. While it is true that blacks did not receive a formal
national grant of citizenship until the Fourteenth Amendment, it is also true that the kinds
of rights Congress granted to blacks as free persons in 1866--the rights to buy, sell, and
lease property, to make and enforce contracts, and the equal right to operate freely within
the commercial realm-are precisely the kinds of rights the federal courts have been calling the privileges and immunities of citizens since at least 1823. In that year, federal
Circuit Judge Washington propounded the first, and still authoritative, definition of those
privileges: "Protection by the government, with the right to acquire andpossess property
of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject, nevertheless, to
such restraints as the government may prescribe for the general good." Corfield v.
Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (emphasis added). See
also Minor v. Hapersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875); Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
Although in our day, given the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, the prevailing
concept of civil rights is more closely tied to political than to economic rights, modem
American jurisprudence has not yet substantially improved upon the nineteenth century
fuzziness in the concept of citizen rights. To take one example, the reapportionment and
voting right cases assert that the right to vote is a fundamental right of citizens. See generally Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). But the clause in
which the Court finds protection for voting rights is the equal protection clause, which
applies to all persons, not just to citizens. Surely that clause does not require giving the
vote to aliens, but the Court never deals with this anomaly. But see Justice Harlan's passing mention of the issue in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 611-13 (1964) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
Political philosophers as far back as Aristotle (Politics, Book III) have wrestled with
the difficulties of defining citizenship. Perhaps the best we dan do is to admit that the
modem viewpoint linking citizenship to voting rights does somehow articulate the essence
of citizenship, but that there exists a widespread awareness that "citizen" also has a
broader, less technical meaning. That broader meaning would be something like "member
of society," or "one who participates in the societal interactions that constitute community life." It is this broader sense of citizen that the nineteenth century cases express. It is
also this sense that is expressed in the title, Civil Rights Act, given to the 1964 statute
barring discrimination within the commercial realm of buying, selling and hiring. 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000e-15 (1970). This is the sense of the term to which this essay
refers in its claim that the sphere of public life is the sphere of citizen rights.
135. 96 S. Ct. at 2594-95.
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the Thirteenth, and presumably even the Fourteenth Amendment. 13 6 His first
example involved those associations formed for the sake of "effective advocacy of both public and private points of view" 137 that are protected by a
right of association implied in the First Amendment. It may be significant
that Justice Stewart's explanation of the First Amendment right of association mentioned only associations that aim at the advancement of some idea
or belief. While this would seem to shield religious and political groups
from governmental control of their membership, it does seem to leave open
the question of whether private social clubs may discriminate on the basis of
race. Justice Stewart explicitly reserved any comment on that question, but
he did cite the Moose Lodge precedent with apparent approval.13 8 All one
can definitely conclude is that Justice Stewart and those who concurred with
him, except Justice Powell, probably did not believe that truly private social
clubs were restricted by sections 1981 or 1982, although it is impossible to
say with certainty upon what principle Justice Stewart relied for that conclusion.' 39
136. 96 S. Ct. at 2596-98.
137. 96 S. Ct. at 2596 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1963)).
The Court's position is that while schools are free to teach that the government is wrong
to ban segregation, they are not free to defy that ban by their practices. Freedom of
speech includes the freedom to criticize the laws but not the freedom to disobey them. Cf.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
138. 96 S. Ct. at 2592 n.5. There are, in fact, precedents asserting that social association is part of the constitutional right of association. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965). Justice Stewart joined in the Gilmore majority that asserted a constitutional right to associate
freely and to form "all white, all black, all brown, and all yellow clubs." 417 U.S. at
575.
139. Justice Stewart's various comments in regard to private clubs do provide at
least some grounds for speculation about the principle he has in mind. Justice Stewart
argues that so-called private schools remain outside the reach of the private club exemption of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000e-15 (1970). His concern, however, is evidently broader than the need to refute the claim that the private club
exemption of the 1964 Civil Rights Act implicitly repealed those aspects of sections 1981
and 1982 that might otherwise have applied to private clubs and schools. In the course of
his discussion he asserts that regardless of the public-private question, the private club
exception of the 1964 Civil Rights Act could never properly apply to privately operated
schools because what they are selling is not covered by the general terms of the 1964
Civil Rights Act in the first place. 96 S. Ct. at 2595 n. 10. In this light, his argument that
these private schools are in fact public accommodations seems intended to do more than
merely answer the implied repeal argument. That something more may well be the beginning of an explanation of why sections 1981 and 1982 would not apply to a truly private
social club such as the Moose Lodge.
On the surface those statutes seem to reach private clubs because they sell food,
drink, and access to recreational facilities, and because members contract to acquire recreational and social privileges therein. Justice Stewart's dicta in Runyon, however, seems to
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Justice Stewart's opinion in Runyon noted a second example of private
life protected by the Constitution from the Thirteenth Amendment power of
Congress: the private matters of personal family life-control over the decision whether to bear children and power to supervise their education, including the right to send them to private schools. Justice Stewart noted repeatedly that these parental privacy rights are subject to the power of the
state reasonably to regulate its schools. 4 ' This regulation banning racial
segregation in private schools, he indicated, is reasonable because it furthers
objectives compatible with the Thirteenth Amendment's goal of full civil
freedom for all, regardless of race.' 4 ' In delineating the outer boundaries of
reasonable regulations, Justice Stewart tied parental control over education
to the First Amendment right to inculcate beliefs.
Justice Powell went beyond merely itemizing the specific constitutional
rights that would circumscribe section 1981 and attempted to provide a
principle that would limit the reach of that section. He presented this principle in a strange light. First, he granted that on the basis of history he "might
be inclined" to believe that section 1981 never reaches beyond state action
to the field of private contracts, but he explained that on the grounds of stare
decisis he concurred with the majority because recent precedents were on
their side.' 42 He then concluded that the principle he explicated demarcates
those exceptionally private areas of private life that "certainly were never
indicate that sections 1981 and 1982 would not apply to such associations because those
statutes forbid racial discrimination in buying, selling, and contracting only when one is
dealing with the general biying public. Apparently Congress only has a Thirteenth
Amendment power to assure equality of membership within that general buying public.
This analysis is compatible with the reasoning of the Jones case: To be treated as a
second-class person within the general buying public can plausibly ba viewed as a badge
or incident of slavery, but to be excluded from someone's private circle of friends is
something to which everyone is subject, and can hardly be said to be related to slavery.
140. 96 S. Ct. at 2597-98. In contrast, the decision whether to bear a child may
not be limited by merely reasonable regulations. The justification must be more compelling. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The same high standard would apply to
any regulation touching upon religious as distinguished from secular aspects of private
education. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972). In Yoder, the Court evidently separated the familial right of privacy in controlling a child's secular education
from the right to free exercise of religion in controlling a child's religious education. The
former may be limited by regulations having merely reasonable justification, while the
latter may be limited only by regulations that present compelling justification. This combination of procreation and education precedents creates a strangely bifurcated right of
familial privacy, but even if the compelling interest test were standard for regulating private secular education, section 1981 would meet it easily. The protection of Thirteenth
Amendment rights presents a clearly compelling national interest.
141. See 96 S.Ct. at 2598.
142. Id. at 2602 (Powell, J., concurring).
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intended to be restricted by the Nineteenth Century Civil Rights Acts." 1' 43
What he did not explain was why he was "certain" that the personal-private
sphere that he so carefully delineated was not in the minds of the 1866
Congress, while he was only "inclined" to think that no private action at all
was in their minds. The only reasonable explanation is that he believed that
some activities are so private that no plausible case can be made for including them among the privileges of civil freedom conferred by the Thirteenth
Amendment. What is missing from Justice Powell's significant contribution
to the development of a private sphere-public sphere doctrine is a discussion of just what was implied by the promise of civil freedom announced in
the Thirteenth Amendment or by the grant of citizenship in the first clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. In other words, Justice Powell focused on the
question of what constitutes the private sphere, paying virtually no attention
to what comprises the public sphere.
What Justice Powell did attempt was to characterize those agreements
and associations between private persons that are "so personal" that they
are not properly treated as part of the public world of contracts governed by
section 1981. In place of the term "private sphere" he used the phrases
"personal invitations," "purposes of exclusiveness," and "associational
rights." 4 4 For the term "public sphere," he substituted the phrases" constituency more public than private," "commercial relationship offered generally or widely," and "open offer to the public.' 45 In short, Justice Powell's rule for delineating the private sphere 146 would allow freedom of association to prevail "where the offerer selects those with whom he desires to
bargain on an individualized basis, or where the contract is the foundation of
a close association (such as, for example, that between an employer and a
private tutor, babysitter, or housekeeper) .141
Before leaving the Runyon case, it is appropriate to consider briefly the
dissent of Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist.1 48 A strong case exists
for limiting their dissent to its express concern: the question of accurate
statutory construction. But two pieces of evidence support the view that
Justice White would not object to the view that private schools are, in fact,
143. Id. at 2603.
144. Id. at 2602-03.
145. Id.
146. It should be noted that he is speaking here of the reach of the particular statute,
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), while we are using the term to limit the constitutional reach of
Congress' civil rights powers. The latter may, of course, be the basis of Justice Powell's
conclusions regarding the former.
147. 96 S.Ct. at 2602 (Powell, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 2604-15 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.).
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part of the public sphere and therefore subject to a congressional ban on race
discrimination. First, there is his express statement: "I do not question at
this point the power of Congress or a state legislature to ban racial discrimination in private school admissions decisions. But as I see it Congress has
not yet chosen to exercise that power.""14 Secondly, both Justices White
and Rehnquist joined the Court's decisions in Norwood v. Harrison' and
Gilmore v. City of Montgomery 5 ' to forbid, solely on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, the grant by state governments to discriminatory private
schools of benefits conferred upon all accredited schools,' 5 2 decisions that
took the Court to the brink of declaring that the Fourteenth Amendment
itself prohibits racial discrimination by privately-operated schools. Because
both Justices White and Rehnquist were willing to go that far, it seems clear
that once they became convinced on the question of statutory construction
they would be willing to have private schools fall within the Thirteenth
Amendment reach of Congress.
VI. Conclusions: The Advantages of the
Public-Private Distinction
By 1971 the Supreme Court had converted the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments into weapons strong enough to remove the state action
shackles from the power of Congress to protect what it reasonably deems to
be the basic rights of American citizens. But once those shackles were
removed, the reach both of these new Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment weapons and the new interpretations given to sections 1981 and 1982
remained to be delineated. Both questions involved the underlying query of
how far into the sphere of private life these new weapons penetrated.
The Court in Moose Lodge took its first step toward a new approach for
answering those questions, and in Runyon took its second. In Moose Lodge
the Court indicated that in the search for "state action" public accommodations and institutions that perform a normally governmental function will be
deemed to be covered by the Fourteenth Amendment if racial discrimination
is involved. On the other hand, if the truly private life of the home or of
personal association is involved, the Fourteenth Amendment forbids only
governmental compulsion to discriminate; it cannot reach truly private discrimination.
Although these distinctions were developed in applications of the Fourteenth Amendment, they were adapted in Runyon to clarify the outer bounds
149. Id. at 2605 n.2.

150. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
151. 417 U.S. 566 (1974).
152. See text accompanying notes 114-31 supra.
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of the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement statutes, sections 1981 and 1982.
Those statutes were held not to negate the rights of association created by the
First Amendment. The idea that there is a right to discriminate within a
sphere of private life 513 is thereby intertwined with the concept of First
Amendment rights."5 4 Thus, the prohibitions of discrimination contained in
sections 1981 and 1982 will reach as far as the sphere of civic life itself,
certainly including the whole world of essentially commercial transactions,
but will not extend into the protected sphere of truly private life, even
though there may be some contracting or some buying and selling in that
private sphere.' 5 5
The developments in the civil rights cases of the last five years outlined
here are fully compatible with two lines of doctrinal development extending
over the past fifteen years that have more clearly distinguished the public
sphere from the private. Racial discrimination was prohibited by Congress
in the public spheres of service by private hotels and restaurants involved in
interstate commerce, of employment practices by certain private commercial
establishments, and of the private sale and rental of real estate under many
153. The Court is quite ambiguous on the question whether the right to discriminate
is actually protected. The Court cites Justice Douglas' dissent in Moose Lodge: "The associational rights which our system honors permit all white, all black, all brown, and all
yellow clubs to be formed. . . . Government may not tell a man or woman who his or
her associates must be. . . . The freedom to associate applies to the beliefs we share,
and to those we consider reprehensible." Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163,
179-80 (Douglas & Marshall, JJ., dissenting), cited in Gilmore v. City of Montgomery,
417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974)..But the justices also qualify the point with a reminder that
"the freedom to associate by some may serve to infringe that freedom for others. Invidious discrimination takes its own toll on the freedom to associate ......
Gilmore v. City
of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974). See also Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S.
455, 469-70 (1973).
154. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 430-31 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
155. Various versions of this idea were developed in legal commentary even before
Runyon, although no one tied it to the Moose Lodge development. Buchanan, Federal
Regulation of Private Racial Prejudice:A Study of Law in Search of Morality, 56 IOWA
L. REV. 473, 507 (1971); Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination:The
Revival of the Endorsement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM.
L. REV. 449, 487 (1974); Note, Discriminationin Private Social Clubs: Freedom of Association and Right to Privacy, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1181, 1208, 1214-17; Comment, Association, Privacy and the Private Club: The Constitutional Conflict, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 460, 469-70 (1970); Note, Developing Legal Vistas for the Discouragement of
Private Club Discrimination, 58 IOWA L. REv. 108, 136-41 (1972); Note, The Desegregation of Private Schools: Is Section 1981 the Answer?, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1147 (1973);
Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Private Club Discrimination, 1970 Wis. L. REV. 595; Note,
Section 1981 and Private Groups: The Right to Discriminate versus Freedom from Discrimination, 84 YALE L.J. 1441, 1449-50 n.45 (1975).
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circumstances. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court was discovering a constitutionally protected sphere of privacy in which individual liberty is the preferred value. "' This sphere includes the privacy of one's own dwelling
place,15 the privacy of family life,158 and the privacy of social association.15 9 These two developments would be wholly consonant with an explicit
announcement by the Court that the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits racial discrimination in the public but not in the truly private
sphere.
In addition to clarifying this long-confused area of the law, an explicit
announcement of the public sphere-private sphere doctrine would have two
additional advantages. First, there are two relatively standard reasons cited
by commentators for replacing the state action doctrine with a full-blown
public sphere doctrine: (1) A public sphere doctrine seems to be closer than
the state action doctrine to the true purpose of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments,16 ° and (2) a public sphere doctrine makes more
sense in light of the ubiquitous interconnections between governmental and
non-governmental life in recent times.' 6 1 Second, the recent cases demand
utilization of a public-private distinction as a tool of resolution. With no
real acknowledgement that it was moving far away from the state action
doctrine, the Court in Runyon was forced to employ the public sphereprivate sphere rationale to settle the issues presented in that case. Similar
questions can be expected to reach the Court soon. The Court recently
refused to hear the appeal of a case posing the question of whether a private
yacht club may bar blacks from membership,' 6 2 but the justices will not be
able to ignore the issue forever. If the constitutional concerns both for the
liberty of private life and for equality of treatment in the world of citizen life
are to be respected, both of these concerns should be faced squarely by the
Court.
156. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
157. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
158. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 197 (1973);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485-86 (1965).
159. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
160.

See H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION

OF THE FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT

(1908); Bickel, The Original Understandingand the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1955); Black, supra note 14, at 100-03, 108; Carl, Reflections on the "Sit-ins,"
46 CORNELL L.Q. 444, 454-55 (1961); Frank & Munro, The Origianl Understanding of
"Equal Protection of tile Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131 (1950); Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1954).
161. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
162. Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 530 F.2d 16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 97
S. Ct. 186 (1976).
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In Runyon the Court quite properly ignored the sterile state action
question of the degree of government involvement in the schools when it
declared that section 1981 did indeed cover contracts for the services of
private schools. More importantly, the Court in the Runyon case faced more
directly than ever before the crucial question of where to draw the line
between the public and the private spheres. Both Justice Stewart's opinion
for the Court and Justice Powell's separate concurrence made important
statements about the sphere of private life. Although the Court gave considered attention in Runyon to the nature of the private sphere, it has yet to
combine those reflections with comparably well-developed reflections concerning the sphere of public life. The Court will continue to look beyond the
state action question, as it has been doing quietly since 1972,163 but, in
addition, it should admit that what it is looking at is the question of which
activities fall into the sphere of the public life of the community.
163. See Note, Section 1981 and Private Groups: The Right to Discriminate versus
Freedom from Discrimination, 84 YALE L.J. 1441, 1464-65 (1975), in which the author
agrees that the Court has sub silentio been making public versus private sphere distinctions, but, unlike this article, it does not note the seminal impact of Moose Lodge in this
development. See also 22 J. PUB. L. 281 (1973), which does acknowledge the public
sphere shift in Moose Lodge but does not include comment on later developments.

